With the 11th amendment to German Competition Law (GWB) in 2023, lawmakers provided the Bundeskartellamt with a tool that had long been missing: Following sector inquiries, the agency can now intervene on its own, including by imposing structural measures. So far, this tool has been used only to a limited extent.
What has changed?
The new Section 32f of German Competition Law (GWB) has since enabled the Federal Cartel Office to address significant and lasting distortions of competition even in the absence of a proven legal violation. This marks a regulatory paradigm shift. Since then, it has been possible to address structural competition problems even in the absence of a classic antitrust violation—for example, by facilitating market entry for new competitors, directly addressing tacit collusion among large providers, or, as a last resort, breaking up companies with significant market power.
Remarkable Track Record in the United Kingdom
The potential of this tool is enormous—as the former Competition Commission (CC) in the United Kingdom impressively demonstrated beginning in the late 2000s. It repeatedly ordered structural remedies following sector inquiries in order to break up entrenched market structures: For example, it required the airport operator BAA to sell several airports, ordered the sale of a cement plant to a new competitor in the cement sector, and, in the market for ground blast furnace slag, compelled both the sale of a plant and the supply of the necessary feedstock to the new owner.
Although today’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) does not follow this practice with the same rigor, it nevertheless continues to use follow-up measures resulting from sector inquiries to address structural competition issues. Examples range from interventions in the British energy market – including measures to facilitate switching providers and ensure price transparency – to measures in the retail banking sector, under which banks were required, among other things, to inform customers about overdraft fees via an app. In addition, the CMA also intervened in the funeral services sector and required companies to comply with a set of binding transparency and conduct requirements in a market where, due to the unique circumstances, demand is only moderately price-sensitive and cannot respond in an economically rational manner.
The British experience thus demonstrates that market investigations go far beyond mere market analysis, and that follow-up measures can serve as flexible tools for shaping competitive structures in a sustainable manner.
So far, the results in Germany have been disappointing
In contrast, the results in Germany have been rather disappointing so far. Since the amendment to the GWB took effect, only six sector inquiries have been completed. More seriously, however, only two of these proceedings have led to any follow-up measures based on the new instrument; indeed, it is hardly possible to speak of any genuine intervention.
Following the sector inquiry into “Municipal Waste and Empty Glass,” the Federal Cartel Office is examining whether the conditions under Section 32f(2) of German Competition Law (GWB) are met to require a company to notify mergers even if they fall below the usual thresholds. The aim is to subject the Rethmann Group’s (Remondis) further expansion to more rigorous antitrust scrutiny. Those who had expected the new instrument to be used to break up market power will be disappointed.
The second case was somewhat more ambitious: Based on the findings of the sector inquiry into “Refineries and Fuel Wholesale,” the Federal Cartel Office found evidence of a significant distortion of competition and opened an investigation in March 2025 to examine, in particular, the role of price quotations. However, this proceeding can currently “only be continued to a very limited extent, as the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf has yet to rule, in summary proceedings, on objections filed in July 2025 against the Office’s orders to disclose information.”
The real problems remain unaddressed
Without denying the relevance of the markets under investigation, the Federal Cartel Office’s selection of markets nevertheless appears highly selective. While the Cartel Office analyzes municipal solid waste and hollow glass, markets that are particularly concentrated and directly relevant to consumers remain largely untouched.
These include, in particular, the food retail sector and the associated agricultural supply chains, for which the last sector inquiry took place twelve years ago. Our latest study, conducted in collaboration with Misereor, shows that there remains a significant need for further investigation and action in this area. In it, we describe a growing concentration across several stages of the food supply chain, from seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural machinery through processing to food retail. There, the four largest retail groups—Aldi, Rewe, the Schwarz Group, and Edeka—now control more than 87 percent of the German market. This leads to growing dependence among agricultural businesses, declining bargaining power for smaller suppliers, unfair trade practices, and higher price markups for consumers.
The same applies to key digital markets. Particularly in the strategically important markets for cloud and AI services, a sector inquiry is clearly warranted. Yet the Federal Cartel Office has so far remained inactive. Accordingly, the civil society organization Foxglove and 13 other organizations have called for such an inquiry. Their reasoning is as follows:
„Without decisive action, the major technology companies will dominate the emerging market for generative AI, since it is based on cloud computing services that they already control today.“
Conclusion: More Courage, More Impact
It is precisely in markets like these, with structural competition problems, that Section 32f of German Competition Law (GWB) could realise its true potential. It makes it possible not only to diagnose competition problems but also to address them through access obligations, behavioral requirements, or divestitures. However, this requires that the instrument not merely exist on paper but be actually utilized.
Since 2023, the Federal Cartel Office has had powers that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. So far, however, it has treated them more as a theoretical fallback option than as a central tool of competition policy. Experience from the United Kingdom shows that effective competition does not arise solely through analysis and recommendations, but through the resolute use of regulatory powers.
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